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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

CLARENCE P.

~fARTIN,

Appellant,
vs.

No. 7766

R.A.LPH L. JONES, d/b/a Mountair
Pharmacy,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Responden_t hereby respectfully petitions the court
to set aside its decision in the above entitled cause and
to grant a rehearing thereof on the following grounds:
.1. _ The court has misapplied the law by holding, in
effect, that, assuming appellant to have been a trespasser, respondent owed him a duty greater than that·
to which a trespasser is entitled.
2. The court in effect enlarges the duty owing by a
possessor of land to a treS'passer beyond the duty heretofore defined by the· unanin1ous decisions of the courts
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and makes indistinguishable the duty oWing to tres ..
passers and invitees.
3. The decision opens the door to all kinds of claims
by persons having no right to go upon t~1e premises and
\vho, as a result of their trespassing, may be injured by
an artificial condition which may suit the convenience
and purposes. of the owner of the property, and which.
condition he ought to have a right to maintain as .such
owner even though the same might be dangerous to
trespassers.
4. The court has disregarded entirely the element
of appellant's contributory negligence, which, even under
the unusual rule of liability announced by .the court,
justified the verdict of the jury.
ARGU~fENT
OWNER'S LIABILITY TO TRESPASSER

Who is a

trespasser~

The court has said :

''A trespasser is defined as a :person ·who
. enters or remains upon land in possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the
possessor's consent or otherwise.'' In Re Wimmers Estate, 111 ·Utah 444, 182 Pac. (2d) 119.
In his opinion Justice Wolfe assumes that the plaintiff w:as a trespasser and he departs from the rule established by the decisions of the courts to follow. the academic statement in the "Restatement Of The Law Of
Torts'·', which, we submit, if given practical application
virtually makes the possessor of real property an insurer
of .the safety of all persons \vho, having no right to
.2
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go upon his property, are injurL.lll by 8otue <:'ondi t ion
which, though it n1ay be dangerous to such trespasser,
the o'vner desires for his o"ll conYenienrt:' to maintain.
In other words, the o'Yner n1ust so Inaintnin his premi~PH
that those 'vhom he has not invited to come upon them,
and 'vho have no right there, "·ill be :protected against
injury. Is that to be the la\Y of this state sin1ply upon
the authority of the text referred to and in disreg"ard
of the time-honored principles by "·hich a trespasser
has always been held to assume all ·risks of his trespass except the risk of "·anton or \Yilful injury by the
owner of the property)? \V·e respectfully submit that
this court should not a~andon the old rule which respe-cts
the right of a person to maintain his qwn propert~ as
he sees fit as against persons \vho have no business to
go upon it, and yet which justly gives a trespasser· a
right of action for wanton or wilful injury by such owner.
One .owes trespassers no duty to keep his property
in a safe condition for their use. Ruocco v. ·United A.dvertising Corp. (Conn.), 119 Atl. 48.

A trespasser must accept the existing condition of
the premises· as he finds them. Printy v. Reimbold
(Iowa), 202 NW 122; Pettyjohn v. Basham (Va.), 100
SE 813.
A trespasser can recover nothing from the property owner for injuries resulting from the condition of
the premises although it exists through the owner's
carelessness. Hu.mphery v. Gas Company (Vt.), 139 Atl.
440, 56 ALR 1011.
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· The only duty owed to a trespasser is to refrain
from \vilful and intentional injury or from active negligenc~~ Frederick v. Railroad Comp!any (Wis.), 240 NW
387.
No liability f.or injury to a trespasser can be founded
upon either ordinary or gross negligence; to impose such
liability there must have been a wilful, wanton or reckless act. Ciarmataro v. Adams (11f.ass.), 176 NE 610, 75
ALR 1171.
A trespasser upon the property of another cannot
recover for defects, obstructions or pitfalls upon the
premises unless the injury shall result from wilful or
wanton negligence. Brighan~ v. F,isk-·Carter Co1npany
(N. Carolina), 136 SE 125.
One who enters the prenlises of another as a trespasser does so at his o'vn risk and the owner owes him
no duty to keep the premises in a safe condition. His
only duty is to abstain from 'Y~nton or wilful injury.
Giannini v. Campodonico (Cal.), 22 Pac. 256; llerzog v.
Hemp1hill (Cal.), 93 Pac. 36; Roberts v . Pacific Electric
Company (Cal.), 283 Pac. 353; Dem1ner v. City of Eureka
(Cal.), 178 Pa.c. (2d) 472.
If the rule announced in these and other authorities
is to be disregarded, it will mean that in Utah, trespassers 'vill have rights of action which heretofore,
bench and bar alike, have never believed they had a
right to assert. If an owner chooses to maintain an
artificial condition 'vhich is dangerous, the rule of the
text quoted by Justice Wolfe imposes upon such O\\rner
the duty to act as guardian of trespassers to keep away
4
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from such dangers. The O\vner must ''exercise reasonable eare'' to \Yarn a trespasser if the owner knows
or ought to have known that such trespasser is near the
danger, or if the ovvner has reason to believe that the
trespasser .will not d~iscover the danger. Under such a
rule a trespasser ean al,vays assert that the owner ought
to have knovvn that he, the trespasser, would not ~ikely
discover, and that he did not discover the danger, and
therefore the owner was negligent for failure to keep
his premises safe for fear the tresp·asser. would not
discover the dangerous condition. Or, if the owner ou.ght
to ha.L~e known {vvhether or not he actually knevv) that a
trespasser was in close proximity to the danger, the
o\vner is liable if he fails to warn such tres~passer.
\\T e respectfully contend that the rule announced in

the Restatement ought not to be adopted as the law of
th~s state. It is a theoretic~! refinement and a repudiation of the safe and sane rule which judicial tribunals
have adhered to and enforced from time immemorial.
This new rule imp·oses ~n unfair obligation on property
owners and it possesses no virtue just because it is new,
or because it is intended as a progressive conception as
to a property owner's duty to trespassers.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

There is another reason why the court erred in its
decision. The evidence of contributory negligence of appellant is entirely disregarded. Here are the facts:
1. App.ellant had been in respondent's store ·on
numerous occasions. lie knew that customers did not
5
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frequent the aisle in the liquor department. He had
never seen any customers go into said aisle. (R. 63)
· 2. There vvas a vyarning sign at the very entrance
to this aisle, '' }.J o · Admittance - Ernployees OnJy' '.
(Defendant's Exhibits 3 _and 8)
3. It was 9:30 at night ·of a holiday when the liquor
department was entirely closed (R. 52), and it "\Vas not
an area of the premises which customers had any right,
expr.ess · or ·implied, to handle goods then, or ·at any
time. (Defendant's Exhibit 2)
4. Even though appellant states that he was informed .PY the clerk that the pencils were above the
shelves containing the liquor bottles (R. 43), the jury
had a right to disbelieve such staten1ent and to accept
as true the denial of the ·clerk. ( R. 186-7) In any event,
no ~easonable person would intrude himself into such
part of. the premises to retrieve a pencil from a seven. foot shelf in disreg~rd of the warning sign and when
he already had observed and understood that it was not
customary for any person to enter that :part of the
prem1ses.
5. · The evidence is conclusive that the aisle w·as
well lighted (R. 203) and that appellant, if· he had
exercised any care for his safety, would not have fallen
to his injury.
6. The danger was as obvious to appellant as to
respondent's employee. He was in the aisle before the
clerk \\rent in and had a1nple opportunity t·o note the
condition of the premises.
£
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Justice ''rolfe declares :
''By the respondent's ·own evidence, the appellant did not walk behind the liquor counter and
fall do,vn the duinb~,vaiter shaft without first
being· seen and discovered by one of the respond..:
ent 's en1ployees. One of the clerks noticed the
ap:pellant behind the liquor eounter before his
fall, and in fact 'vent over to serve him. By her
own testimony, she (the clerk) was standing at
the side of the appellant for 'a few minutes' before he fell down the ·shaft.''
Do these recited facts make appellant any less the
trespasser~ Bear in ruind that he went into the aisle
,v-hile ~Irs. Ashley_ was in anothe-r part of the store.
Now suppose as so-on as she entered the ·aisle· she ha.d
said, '• Can't you read the sign, 'No Admittance - For
E1nployees Only'-~ You are· not allowed here. Please
leave.'' And suppose he had then fallen into the shaft.
Would r-espondent h·ave been in any better position~
Would such conduct_. on the part of the clerk have
strengthened respondent's defense~ · Why, .then, was
ap·pellant less negligent because the cl-erk was courteous
enough not to offend him~ Should he be ·advantaged
by her courtesy in failing to offend him~ Competi_tion
in business is too keen to warrant ·clerks in criticizing
the conduct of patrons. Under the- rule announced by
the court, if appellant had been ordered from behind the
counter he 'vould still have been entitled to a warning
of his proximity to the shaft, or to have reli·ed upon
the duty of respondent to know that the shaft (the artificial condi tioiQ was or rnight · be dangerous to him, a
trespasser.
~

I
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Will the court please again inspect the defe·ndant 's
Exhibits 3 and 8 ~ They clearly reveal that the curtains
covered the stock of liquor, and that the liquor

depart~

ment of the store was not open for business. Please
observe the "N·o Ad1nittance" sign in plain view; also
the ver:y narrow passage,vay into the aisle through
which appellant

entered,--~another

suggestive ''No Ad-

mittance'' warning to all but employees. Then as shown
on Exhibit 3, ovserve the distance-. 12 to 15 feet, app·ellant had to walk down the aisle with ample opportunity to observe and ·with the duty to ·observe the condition of the floor which the uncontradicted evidence
shows was well lighted. Assuming respondent owed
appellant the duty to kno\v, at his peril, that the artificial
condition of the premises would likely be dangerous to
appellant, or that respondent owed the duty, in addition
to the warning sign, t·o give him further w-arning of the
dangerous condition, we say, assuming ·either of these
alternatives, if appellant's conduct did not ·constitute
contributory negligence what element is lacking to show
his negligence~ The jury evidently considered him negligent. It is reasonable to so. conclude, and if he \Vas
negligent a different instruction from that complained
of would not have produced, and ought not to have produced, a different verdict.
1

We most respectfully submit that this ·court has
committed a grave error ·and a grave injustice to this
respondent in setting aside the jury's verdict in view
8
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of the record in this case and that it ought, in the interest of justice, to grant a re-hearing.
Respectfully subn1itted,
STEWART, CANNON

E. F.

& HANSON

BALDWIN, JR.

Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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